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LAND-USE PROFILES OF AGRARIAN INCOME AND LAND OWNERSHIP 
INEQUALITY IN THE PROVINCE OF BARCELONA IN MID-NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 
Abstract: According to the existing literature, when land remained the most 
abundant factor an increase in market integration is expected to lead to a 
greater inequality in wealth or income distribution. However, several case 
studies on the vineyard specialization experienced in Catalonia during the 18th 
and 19th centuries suggested another outcome: land ownership and agrarian 
income became less uneven, not the opposite. The outstanding interpretation 
posed by Catalan rural historians deserves to be confirmed or rejected by 
applying different inequality and polarization indices (Gini, Theil and top 
incomes), and innovative methods (inequality possible frontier and extraction 
ratios), to the big dataset we have been able to assemble with the information 
provided for every cadastral taxpayer of each municipality in the Distribution of 
Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership in the Province of Barcelona 
published in 1852 by the Official Gazette, combined with other population and 
land-use data listed in a Land-Use Statistics of the Province of Barcelona 
compiled in 1858. The results confirm that landownership and income inequality 
were lower in winegrowing municipalities than in cereal-cropping or forest ones, 
in spite of the fact that commercial specialization and higher population 
densities could have meant an extended frontier of possible inequality. 
Keywords: agrarian income distribution, land ownership, personal inequality, regional 
inequality, land-use patterns, tax burden 
JEL: N53, D31, H24, Q15 
Resumen: Cuando la tierra aún era el factor más abundante, lo esperable es 
que la integración en el mercado generara una mayor desigualdad en la 
distribución de la riqueza o los ingresos. Sin embargo, varios estudios de caso 
sobre la especialización vitícola catalana de los siglos XVIII y XIX sugieren lo 
contrario. Esa interpretación propuesta por la historiografía rural catalana 
merece ser confirmada o rechazada con la aplicación de diferentes índices de 
desigualdad o polarización (Gini, Theil y la porción en manos del % más rico), y 
nuevos métodos (frontera de desigualdad posible y tasa de extracción), a la 
base de datos que hemos podido reunir con la información proporcionada para 
todos los contribuyentes de cada municipio en la Distribución Personal de la 
Riqueza Territorial publicada en 1852 por el Boletín Oficial de la provincia de 
Barcelona, y por la Estadística Territorial de esta provincia confeccionada en 
1858. Los resultados confirman que la desigualdad en la propiedad de la tierra 
y los ingresos agrarios era menor en municipios vitícolas que en los 
cerealícolas o forestales, pese a que la especialización comercial y una mayor 
densidad de población podrían haber aumentado la frontera de máxima 
desigualdad posible. 
Palabas clave: distribución del ingreso agrario, riqueza patrimonial de bienes 
inmuebles, desigualdad personal, desigualdad territorial, usos del suelo, presión fiscal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There exists in the literature on inequality and economic growth a fairly general 
consensus in considering that the historical processes of commercial specialization and 
economic globalization lead to more uneven distributions of income or wealth—at least 
in an early stage when land remained the most abundant factor endowment. This entails 
a significant point of agreement among many authors that follow mainstream economic 
approaches (Williamson 1991, 1999 and 2006; O'Rourke and Williamson 1999; 
Bourguignon and Morrison 2002; Lindert and Williamson 2003; Acemoglu et al. 2002; 
Milanovic 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Piketty et al. 2006; Atkinson and 
Piketty eds. 2007; Prados de La Escosura 2008; Roine and Waldenström 2009) with 
other who adopt more heterodox interpretive lines (Hornborg et al. 2007). Moreover, 
Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2007) have recently stressed the point that attaining 
higher total incomes thanks to these processes of market integration could also mean an 
upward shift of the inequality possible frontier and a raise in the maximum extraction 
ratio taken by a small elite.  
All that makes a very interesting and somewhat intriguing counterexample the 
process of agricultural specialization in brandies and wines experienced in Catalonia 
from mid-17
th
 century up to the Phylloxera plague at the late 19
th
 century (Vilar 1962; 
Valls 2004). In fact, many existing historical monographs stress the opposite result: the 
spread of vineyards in this North-eastern corner of the Iberian Peninsula led to a less 
unequal rural society (Cussó et al. 2006; Tello et al. 2006; Olarieta, et al. 2008; 
Garrabou et al. 2008; Garrabou et al. 2009).
2
 Therefore, we are going to test this 
hypothesis, put forward by previous comparative local case studies, that the Catalan 
vineyard specialization was accompanied by a reduction of inequality in access to land 
and distribution of agrarian incomes.  
According to these case studies, there would have been two specific mechanisms 
through which winegrowing specialization could have led to a reduction of inequality in 
land ownership and agricultural income, one direct and another indirect. The direct 
                                                 
1
 This work springs from the research project HAR2009-13748-C03-01 on Environmental History of 
Mediterranean Agrarian Landscapes at the University of Barcelona, financed by the Spanish Ministry of 
Science and Innovation (On-line URL:http://www.ub.edu/histeco/p2/eng/index.php). We thank Yaiza 
Alemany, Marta Nieto, Julia Ossorio and Alba Pigrau for their care in transferring data from the 
Repartimiento Personal de la Riqueza Territorial of 1852 to excel sheets for this project. We are very 
grateful to Ricard Garcia Orallo for their valuable assistance in locating this historical source in the 
library of the University of Barcelona, and clarifying its origin from the corresponding Royal Order 
issued by Bravo Murillo at the time. We thank the useful comments by Alfonso Herranz and Jordi Guilera 
at the University of Barcelona, and also to all the assistants to the session 3.4 on "Property rights, social 
inequality, and agrarian change in southern Europe" at the international conference Rural History 2010 
held in the  University of Sussex (UK). None of them are responsible for our own mistakes. 
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 Santiago-Caballero (2011) also shows an inequality decrease in the cereal-growing inland Spanish 
province of Guadalajara during the last third of 18
th
 century due, as it seems, to a successful local land 
reform. 
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mechanism was the leasing of small plots of land from well-off landowners to landless 
winegrowers through a traditional sharecropping contract called in Catalan rabassa 
morta (Carmona and Simpson 1999; Badia-Miró et al. 2010). The tenancy established 
by this peculiar long-lease emphyteutic contract lasted until the death of all vines 
planted by the tenant. Given that before the Phylloxera plague winegrowers used to 
bury strains of their old vines in order to keep them alive, the rabassa tenants tried to 
maintain their access to land almost permanently. The duration of the contract, together 
with the rent share taken by the landowner from the vintage harvested by the 
winegrower, gave rise to a long-lasting class conflict from the end of the 18
th
 century 
until the Spanish Civil War in 1936-1939 (Balcells 1980; Tello 1997; Carmona and 
Simpson 1999). Despite the conflicting social relationship between landowners and 
tenants it entailed, the fact that this tenancy system became so widespread might also be 
acknowledged as an achievement by the poorest sections of Catalan rural society by 
means of their bargaining power and collective action (Garrabou and Tello 2004, 
Garrabou et al. 2010).  
The second indirect mechanism through which vineyard specialization could 
have led to a reduction in landownership and agrarian income inequalities was the 
ability of many rabassa tenants to subsist from their vines, endure the pressure of the 
rent taken by the owner, and prosper enough to buy a small house, an adjoining garden 
and even a plot of their own. It is important to note that many of these landless tenants 
were immigrants initially coming from the South of France and the mountain villages of 
the Pyrenees (Nadal and Giralt 1960). Some others, however, came from the non-
inheriting progeny of the same class of well-off peasants who offered them a rabassa 
tenancy. Furthermore, as non-heirs they received a legitimate compensation from the 
first-born brother heir, which was paid either in cash or with a small plot of land. This 
second mechanism restrained landownership inequality, while the first direct spread of 
rabassa tenancies only reduced the inequality of income distribution. Taken together, 
both entailed an improvement of access to land and income that the rabassa tenants 
managed to open in wine-growing municipalities. These options were not so available 
to the poorest sectors of Catalan rural society in cereal-growing or forest and pasture 
areas. In this sense, we may say that Catalan winegrowing tenants managed to harness 
the ongoing process of population growth, commercial specialization and agricultural 
intensification to carry out a genuine process of empowerment. 
The complex fabric of this mid-19
th
 century Catalan rural society can be 
summarized looking at Figure 1, made out of a cadastral map of the small village of 
Castellar del Vallès drawn by Pedro Ramirez Moreno in 1854—the same topographer 
who compiled the abovementioned Land-Use Statistics of the Province of Barcelona in 
1858 (manuscript 1733 of the National Geographic Institute in Madrid). The most 
apparent feature of agrarian settlement in most of the province was a network of 
scattered poly-cultural farms called masies in Catalan, structured into compact land 
units around an isolated rural dwelling (see the white dots in Figure 1). Thanks to the 
late medieval peasant struggles held in Catalonia before and after the Black Death, the 
well-off landowners who lived in these masies gradually gained control of the rights of 
access to cropped and uncultivated land over a complex and conflictive transition from 
feudalism to agrarian capitalism (Garrabou et al. 2008). From the 17
th
 century onwards 
population growth was fostered by increasing French immigrants and higher birth 
numbers. The owners of the scattered farms saw these immigrants, and the disinherited 
descendants of the old local families, as a new and frightening landless class that tried 
to establish itself in the villages or towns between their networks of masies. 
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However, landowners soon discovered new favourable opportunities to take 
advantage of their lack of land, their labour availability, and the high relative prices of 
brandy or wine at the time, by leasing to them some marginal lands to plant vineyards. 
Many landless men became winegrowers through the emphyteutic rabassa contract, and 
a new social geography appeared when a patchwork of small vineyard plots arose 
among the interstices of the old poly-cultural masies (Tello et al. 2006; Olarieta et al. 
2008; Marull et al. 2008; Marull et al. 2010). This poorest share of population used to 
live in the streets of small towns or villages, like Castellar del Vallés. While the shape 
of the diverse compact fields of every masia tended to be higher and be located around a 
scattered farmhouse, the small plots of vineyards planted by the rabassers used to be 
orientated towards the village following the existing ways and roads (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Old poly-cultural masies, new vineyard plots and main land-uses in the 
cadastral map of Castellar del Vallès in 1854 
 
Source: made with GIS by Marc Badia-Miró for the research project HAR2009-13748-C03-01, out of the cadastral 
map 1:5000 drawn by Pedro Moreno Ramirez in 1854 and kept in the historical archive of the Catalan Cartographic 
Institute. It has been reproduced in (Garrabou et al. 2010). 
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The abovementioned local case studies have shown a decrease in the Gini 
coefficients of landownership distribution from the beginning of the 18
th
 century up to 
the Phylloxera Plague (Garrabou et al. 2008; Garrabou et al. 2009). Later, when every 
old vine had been ravaged during the 1880s, all the rabassa contracts came to an end 
and many tenants were evicted or gave up winegrowing. Many old masia owners 
recovered the land, and there was a new increase in landownership inequality—at least 
in municipalities such as Castellar del Vallés where most dead vines were not replaced 
by new resistant strains. In other areas, however, vineyards were replanted, many 
rabassa tenancies persisted, and with them the conflicts about the rent shares or vines 
and land entitlements lasted another half a century up to the Spanish Civil War and 
Franco's dictatorship (Badia-Miró et al. 2010). Anyway, could this pathway be 
generalized assuming that the reduction in inequality of the rural Catalan society up to 
mid-19
th
 century was a general trend triggered by the spread of vineyard specialization? 
We might cast some doubts on that, considering the following three points, 
briefly mentioned earlier. First of all, commercial specialization could attract more 
immigrants to the municipalities where vineyards were spreading, and also foster 
population growth in them by increasing birth rates, thus increasing the number of 
people who owned only very small plots or had no land of their own. Secondly, the 
spread of vineyards also raised the total income and wealth of the whole rural 
community. As Milanovic et al. (2007) have pointed out a higher income in a wealthier 
economy could also mean the possibility to increase the extraction ratio taken by a 
small elite, thus raising the frontier of maximum inequality. Thirdly, there are many 
historical examples showing that an increase in market integration and globalization 
lead to a greater inequality, not the opposite (Hornborg et al. 2007). Even adopting a 
standard Heckscher-Ohlin approach, this could be the expected outcome when land was 
still the most abundant factor endowment of a region joining a global market 
(Acemoglu et al. 2002; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). 
 
II. INEQUALITY OF WHAT, AND FROM WHOM? 
 
Having these historical and theoretical considerations in mind, we cannot take 
for granted that the reduction of inequality in landownership or agrarian incomes was a 
general trend in the province  of Barcelona, without carrying out a cross-section analysis 
encompassing a great deal of municipalities. To do this, we have taken as a main source 
the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 published in the 
Official Gazette of the Barcelona province. This rather exceptional document lists for 
each of the municipalities the names of all owners of land, houses and livestock who 
were subject to payment of the cadastral tax, adding up the monetary evaluation of their 
taxable incomes and annual tax burden paid. Drawn from this source, we have been able 
to include in our database more than 86,000 taxpayers in 295 municipalities out of the 
311 existing at present in the province. These real estate owners represented 12% of the 
total population, 24% all males, and 41% of all male inhabitants older than 21 recorded 
in the provincial census of 1857. The second main source used in our database is a 
Land-Use Statistics of the Province of Barcelona compiled in 1858 by a Spanish 
topographer, Pedro Moreno Ramirez, which relates the total agrarian area and the extent 
occupied by each agricultural, forest or pasture land-use in each municipality. This 
information has been combined with the 1857 census data, so as to construct a dataset to 
find out the land-use profiles of agrarian income and land ownership inequality in the 
province of Barcelona in mid-19
th
 century. 
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The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 is  a very 
exceptional source. According to the Royal Order issued by the then Managing Director 
of Taxes, Statistics and State Heritage, all Spanish provinces had to publish in their 
Official Gazettes the whole list of taxpayers, with the taxes they paid and tax burden 
applied. The aim was to give them "all possible safeguards that are not required to pay 
a greater tax burden than the one it corresponds to each one, providing for this purpose 
a reliable mean to check that the fee which appears in the receipts collectors must 
provide to them is entirely equal to that assigned to them by the established procedures" 
(Bravo Murillo 1852). The document offers a list of the names of each local taxpayer, 
the cadastral estimated value of his or her property, and the amount of taxes yearly paid. 
Then, at the end of the list, the total cadastral value of all lands, houses and livestock 
was added up, together with the total amount of cadastral taxes yearly paid in the 
municipality. Finally, the two sums were used to assess the tax burden, calculated as the 
percentage share taken by the cadastral tax out of the total income estimated in the 
cadastre.  
Such unusual transparency can only be understood in the context of the initial 
efforts to build and legitimate a modern land tax system developed by the Spanish 
liberal governments after the new Tax Act passed in 1845. Unfortunately, these efforts 
failed to achieve their ultimate goals for over a century. During the 19
th
 century and the 
first third of the 20
th
 century all Spanish liberal governments never ended the cadastral 
maps and enquiries needed to assess an income value for each land unit devoted to a 
specific crop in a given type of soil, so as to apply a uniform tax burden to calculate the 
amount of annual taxes to be paid by each taxpayer (Nadal and Urteaga 1990; Muro et 
al. 1996). Without all this complex process of cadastral inquiry no one could guarantee 
that properties of equal value always paid the same tax burden in all the municipalities. 
Due to this long-lasting failure of completing a true cadastral survey, a temporary tax 
system called amillaramientos was established. Instead of following a bottom up 
process to comply with the most basic principle of tax equity, the system of 
amillaramientos ran top to bottom. Each year the provincial quotas were politically 
distributed in Parliament at first, and then each provincial quota was politically shared 
out between municipalities by provincial governors (Carrasco 1867). It was only at 
municipal level were the already given amount of taxes to be paid for was distributed 
among the taxpayers according to the estimated cadastral value of their property and 
income—although provincial governors could take into account the local cadastral 
information also to allocate the provincial tax quota in each municipality.  
The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership published in 
1852 clearly demonstrated that the tax burden applied to different municipalities varied 
a lot, from twelve per cent of the local aggregated income up to more than twenty. It 
seems rather understandable that the bold initiative taken by the Spanish Ministry of 
Finance, ordering all provinces to publish their list of taxpayers, was carried out only 
once—as far as we know. Several historians have used some partial information taken 
from these provincial lists (Díez-Espinosa 1986; Segura 1993; Calatayud et al. 2000; 
Díaz-Marín 2000; Burgueño 2007), but this is the first time that a big dataset is created 
and fully analysed using the whole information they contain. 
All these details are relevant for our purpose, because they entail a very 
important ambiguity in the economic data provided by this exceptional source. The 
primary information contained in the local amillaramientos referred to the surfaces of 
land owned by each taxpayer, together with their houses and livestock. Clearly, this was 
information on the distribution of agrarian wealth. Owing to other contemporary 
sources (Peña 1852; Carrasco 1867) we know the specific methods used by the Finance 
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officials to estimate in monetary terms an average yearly income from the cadastral 
information on personal properties recorded in physical units. However, only these final 
cadastral estimates of annual incomes were published in the Distribution of Personal 
Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852. This is understandable, taking into account 
the aim to assess the tax burden variation among different taxpayers and municipalities 
of the same province. But it requires us to deal with the resulting ambiguity: are we 
calculating inequalities of wealth or income? It is well known that inequality of wealth 
is always greater than income inequality (Van Zanden 1995). While all people should at 
least be able to survive with the latter, properties were usually the results of a long-
lasting accumulation that could only be carried out by those having higher incomes, and 
often over generations (Shenk et al. 2010). 
The answer is far from simple. We cannot take this income information as if it 
had recorded all sorts of agrarian earnings, since only the estimated revenues from land, 
houses and livestock were included. All the data provided is about the aggregate value 
of these properties locally owned by each taxpayer. However, this information on 
personal wealth is given by means of an estimated average income that any owner or 
tenant could obtain yearly from their properties, according to the standardized 
procedures applied by the cadastral officials. Surprisingly enough, the Gini coefficients 
obtained from this indirect data on personal agrarian wealth, by means of an estimated 
value of a yearly income taken from them, are rather similar to the ones directly 
calculated from the distribution of landownership measured in surface units from the 
local amillaramientos.  This intriguing coincidence deserves to be studied in the future, 
and might have something to do with the existence of proportionality between the 
distributions of wealth and rents paid for housing (Peña 1852). Some economists had 
alleged the existence of this kind of correspondence at the time, and suggested to use the 
data on rental housing as an easy proxy for personal income (San Julián 2010). 
In any case, the way of accounting the value of agrarian wealth of every 
taxpayer through an estimated income introduces and important bias in our dataset: a 
relevant share of all taxpayers included in the lists had only a very poor house of their 
own. Their recorded income was the implicit rent that could have been obtained by 
leasing these poor houses in the market, after having deduced a quarter of the rent as 
repair costs. Some others could also be sharecroppers, either as rabassa winegrowing 
tenants living in a village or as sharecropping families who, according to another typical 
Catalan contract called masoveria, had to live in the farmhouse where they worked—
usually when landowners were wealthy enough not to work the masia by themselves. In 
this case, the cadastral valuation had to include the sharecropper with their net income, 
obtained by deducting from their annual earnings the rent paid to the landowner (Peña 
1852). 
However, in most cases there were in the Distribution of Personal Wealth in 
Real Estate Ownership of 1852 a great deal of very poor taxpayers with only rather 
fictitious incomes, because they were below the lowest male agricultural wage at the 
time, and no one could have survived with such a yearly earning. According to the 
available series of Catalan agricultural wages for unskilled tasks, like digging, during 
the five years between 1850 and 1854 an agricultural labourer who worked 260 days a 
year would earn an income of some 1,720 Spanish reales in the province of Barcelona 
(Ramon Garrabou and Tello 2002). The urban planner Ildefons Cerdà calculated the 
prevailing family budgets at the time in Barcelona, and according to his detailed data 
the subsistence minimum expenditure on food, clothing and housing would have 
required some 6,622 reales for a full working-class family (Cerdà 1967-1968 [1867]). 
This means that at least three or four adult unskilled wages like the ones considered 
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would have had to be added up in order to achieve the minimum standard of living 
calculated by Cerdà. The cost of living was probably cheaper outside Barcelona, but this 
data reveal that some 1,500 to 2,000 reales could be considered a minimum income to 
survive at the time. However, the list of taxpayers in the Distribution of Personal 
Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 included a lot of people below that level (see 
Table A1 in the annex): an astonishing 84-87% appeared in the document with a 
cadastral attributed income under the abovementioned poverty line of 1,500-2,000 
annual reales.  
Although all these people who had such a small property worth less than 2,000 
reales a year only owned 27% of all income recorded, they paid a respectable 30% of 
all cadastral taxes raised in the whole province. And if we set aside the very special case 
of Barcelona city, in the rest of rural districts the proportion of taxes paid by taxpayers 
with an attributed income lower than 2,000 reales ranged from 32 to 50%. Assuming 
that such poor taxpayers had endured exactly the same tax rate as the very rich, the 
prevailing tax system would already have been very regressive. Our data show that they 
always bore an even higher tax burden (see Table A2 in the annex). This clearly 
explains why the wealthy rural elites were so interested in including such a great 
amount of poor people in the list of taxpayers.  They had already discovered, together 
with the provincial officials, that the Spanish Treasure could raise a lot by extracting a 
bit from many taxpayers who only had very little. Insofar as the tax quotas of each 
province and municipality came as given by previous policy decisions taken top-to-
bottom from the parliament and provincial governors, it was literally true that 
everything paid by the poorest contributors became tax cuts for the wealthy taxpayers. 
In per capita terms, while the vast majority of poorer taxpayers were only 
attributed with cadastral earnings ranging from several tens to some hundreds of reales, 
and paid taxes for a few tens to less than a real per year, the small group of the richest 
taxpayers owned rural properties worth tens of thousands reales, and paid taxes for 
several thousand reales a year. It was as if they were in different orders of magnitude, 
and somehow they were. In an electoral system based on the census of taxes paid, this 
clear differentiation between levels of wealth and taxation meant that only major 
taxpayers were entitled to vote. We wonder, though, if the Spanish tax system described 
above might have something to do with the granting of voting rights to the entire adult 
male population as early as 1890; and also, consequently, with the immediate corruption 
of this general male suffrage by the so called Spanish caciquismo (Moreno-Luzón 
2007). The anomalous tax system based on the political up-to-bottom allocation of 
cadastral quotas established, in effect, a perverse rule of the game encouraging the 
creation of vertical lobbies to get the minimum tax share to be paid to the Treasure, and 
receive the maximum public expenditure in each province and municipality (Curto-Grau 
et al. 2010). A comparative historical study of the relationship between the tax and 
electoral systems might shed new light on that matter. 
In any case, the inclusion of so many people owning only a house, and perhaps a 
garden, together with landless tenants with very low yearly earnings, clearly biases our 
database on landownership and agrarian incomes derived from it. However, their 
presence also provides valuable information. Furthermore, it is not easy to establish a 
non-arbitrary threshold value to clearly separate the 'real' agricultural landowners to the 
ones who mainly earned most of their living working with their hands, in spite of 
having a house and a small plot of their own, or perhaps a sharecropping contract. We 
will later explain the solutions we have found to deal with this database in order to try to 
obtain significant results on wealth and income distribution.  
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Before resuming with our analysis, we must refer to other concerns raised by 
this historical source. What credibility can we give to the information it contains, given 
the tax purpose of the document? Our research team has worked for many years using 
the private accounting records of the patrimony of the Marquis of Sentmenat, one of the 
richest Catalan landowners at the time. From his private records, we know that during 
the five years between 1850 and 1854 the Marquis earned in the two municipalities of 
Sentmenat, and Palau-solità-i-Plegamans, an actual average income of 12,047 and 
15,983 reales a year respectively (Ramón Garrabou, Planas, and Saguer 2001). The 
Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 attributed to the 
Marquis of Sentmenat a yearly cadastral income of 11,607 and 15,323 reales in the 
same municipalities: a downward deviation of only 3.9%! Although this is only a single 
case, the comparison increases significantly our trust in the accuracy of the information 
provided by this source. 
 
III. NO APPARENT INEQUALITY PATTERN? 
 
In order to obtain a set of municipality groups based on statistically rigorous 
assembly, the dataset has been split off according to similarity criteria considering 
cluster analysis from the percentage of winegrowing, cereal-cropping or forest area over 
total agricultural land of each municipality.
3
 The resulting land-use categories were five: 
mainly winegrowing with an important share of cereal-cropping land-use (group 1), 
mainly cereal-cropping (group 2), mainly cereal-cropping with an important share of 
winegrowing land-use (group 3), mainly winegrowing (group 4) and mainly forest 
(group 5). The first result get by mapping this clusters has been quite puzzling. 
Comparing the maps in Figure 2, no apparent pattern seems to appear in the spatial 
distribution of main land-uses and prevailing inequality of agrarian incomes earned 
from real estate ownership. Often, the differences between neighbouring municipalities 
located in the same zone of land-use specialization were as pronounced as the ones 
observed among the major boundaries between land-use areas of winegrowing, cereal-
cropping, and woodland. 
 
Figure 2. Comparison between the main cluster land-use groups and the Gini indices of 
inequality in the municipalities of the province of Barcelona in 1852-1858 
                                                 
3
 We consider non-hierarchical clustering used in MINITAB 15.1. It clusters the data according to 
MacQueen's algorithm (see Johnson and Wichern 2007). The information of municipal land uses has been 
taken from the 1858 Land-Use Statistics of the Province of Barcelona compiled by Pedro Moreno Ramirez. 
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Source: our own, from the Land-Use Statistics of the Province of Barcelona compiled in 1858 by the topographer 
Pedro Moreno Ramirez (manuscript 1733 of the National Geographic Institute), and from the Distribution of 
Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 (Library of the University of Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13). 
 
Nevertheless, a clearer picture arises when the mean and median values obtained 
for each cluster land-use group are compared with the ones of the whole sample (Figure 
3). The Gini indices were actually lower in the winegrowing municipalities than in 
cereal-cropping or mixed land-use ones, while the highest inequality values were 
recorded in mainly forest areas. 
 
 
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Figure 2. 
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However, the differences between averages appear to be less marked than 
expected while the value distances among mean and median warns us about the likely 
existence of non-normal distributions in the dataset. This first outcome leads us to ask 
about the underlying reasons for this lack of an apparent pattern of inequality in the 
incomes earned from rural properties in the province of Barcelona in mid-19
th 
century, 
and the best statistical way to deal with them. Taking into account the characteristics of 
the available information, and the abovementioned biases present in the dataset, we can 
outline a list of five likely factors that may have obscured these first results: 
 
1. There were no large areas of monoculture in the province of Barcelona; 
almost all municipalities combined different proportions of any sort of land 
usages. The very different size of townships, and the absence of large flat 
areas, involved the existence of many contrasting realities in the land-uses 
prevailing within each municipality. In particular, the larger and more 
populous townships always combined cereal crops in the flattest lands with 
forest uses in the more slopping ones, and vineyards planted in intermediate 
slopes. Thus, we have never a ‗pure‘ winegrowing municipality clearly 
detached from other totally devoted to cereal or forest uses. 
2. As explained above, the database includes only taxpayers who had some real 
estate of their own. That means excluding some people deprived of property 
that, nevertheless, earned most or all of their income by working in 
agriculture. At the same time, however, the database includes a large 
proportion of taxpayers only owing a poor house and a small vegetable 
garden, or having a sharecropping contract. Whether they owned a house or 
hired one in the market, the differences could be minimal. If there existed a 
significant number of adults deprived of property, and they were unevenly 
distributed between municipalities with different land usages, this may 
introduce another bias in our database. 
3. The simultaneous presence of wealthy landowners and well-off peasants 
along with a high proportion of landless residents who only held a poor 
house with garden, or could rely on a sharecropping contract, involves 
mixing very different realities in the same database. The resulting 
distribution seems to move in different orders of magnitude. As already 
explained, this is largely the outcome of ambiguous data which is halfway 
between a distribution of land ownership and a distribution of agrarian 
income. To make it more coherent and handier, either all types of income are 
included in the database or all attributed cadastral earnings should be 
converted into the original valuation of real estate property. 
4. The municipalities were not only very different in size, but also in 
population and wealth. As population density increased, so did the number 
of residents who made their living with activities that had little or nothing to 
do with land and livestock ownership. In this point, the contrast between 
rural towns, villages and the city matters. Barcelona becomes a special case, 
and often we need to set it aside as an outlier. 
5. The inequality degree in the distribution of agrarian income within each 
municipality also depended on its level of wealth. As mentioned earlier, 
poorer areas could have lower indexes because people had to achieve at least 
a subsistence minimum. However, the frontier of maximum inequality rose 
along with the wealth of a community. Consequently, the comparisons of 
inequality between municipalities should take into account their respective 
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levels of wealth. For example, if inequality indices were lower in 
winegrowing municipalities than in the ones where cereal crops or forest 
uses predominated, and these areas specialized in vineyards became also 
wealthier, average values do not reflect the greater distance from the 
maximum possible inequality associated with this. 
 
In order to solve these difficulties, and improve the quantitative analysis of our 
enquiry, we will undertake a deeper analysis of rural income inequality taking the 
following three decisions: a) we are going to add to the original database the adult male 
population without any land, house or cattle of their own, taken as a zero group in the 
valuation of property in each municipality, by subtracting from the population census 
figures of 1857 the number of landowners included in the lists of taxpayers of 1852; b) 
we are going to add a minimum vital income of 1,500 reales a year to the earning 
valuation of property held by all inhabitants included in the new dataset, in order to 
overcome the valuation ambiguity of the data on personal wealth by turning it into a 
distribution of agrarian incomes; and c) we are going to set aside the Gini index and use 
Theil indices to carry out further analysis, as these makes it easier to calculate the 
frontier of maximum inequality linked to the wealth of each community, and compare it 
with the actual inequality registered. 
 
IV. A DEEPER ANALYSIS OF AGRARIAN INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
The following calculus of the Theil inequality indices have been obtained from 
the dataset of income cadastral values recorded for every taxpayer included in each 
municipality in the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852:  
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where N is the number of observations, i is the municipality, xi,j each one of the 
individual observations of the annual incomes for every municipality i and x is the 
mean value of the distribution. The Theil index shows less inequality as values tend to 
zero and more inequality as values tend to one. In a first approach, we have considered 
N as the number of all taxpayers in each municipality. This distribution shows the main 
statistics calculated in Table 1: 
 
Table 1. Main statistics of the database on 1852 taxpayers in all the 
municipalities of the province of Barcelona 
Number 295 
Mean 0,195 
Standard deviation 0,074 
Median 0,192 
Source: our own, from the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership 
of 1852 (Library of the University of Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13). 
 
To grasp the outline of this dataset, and obtain a more complete picture of the 
distribution of wealth in the municipalities of the province of Barcelona, we have 
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constructed the histogram which appears in Figure 4. Instead of a normal distribution 
around the mean, it shows higher concentrations of municipalities near two intervals 
which are relatively far from the average. The first peak assembles a group of 
municipalities with lower levels of inequality, around 0.15, while the second one 
displays another group with higher levels of inequality around 0.20—the mean of the 
sample is at 0.19: 
 
Figure 4. Theil Index histogram for all the taxpayers in all the 
municipalities of the province of Barcelona in 1852  
(lognormal fit) 
 
Source: our own, from the same historical source referred in Table 1. 
 
The dispersion of these Theil indices, added to the two peak concentrations 
around inequality values far from the mean, leads us to seek a few complementary 
explanations. As we have already discussed, our dataset is highly heterogeneous. We 
find a maximum population of 235,643 inhabitants in the city of Barcelona, together 
with many municipalities having a minimum below 300 inhabitants. At the same time 
the mean and median values of either the inhabitants or taxpayers differ significantly, 
thus indicating the need for a deeper statistical analysis (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Comparison between the main statistics of the database on 
the number of taxpayers in 1852 and of inhabitants in 1857 in all the 
municipalities of the province of Barcelona 
 Taxpayers in 1852 Inhabitants in 1857 
Maximum 9,616 235,643 
Minimum 17 211 
Mean 297 2,396 
Median 205 979 
Standard deviation 9,616 235,643 
Source: our own, from the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 
1852 (Library of the University of Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13) and population census 
of 1857 (available at URL: http://www.ced.uab.es/index.php?newlang=eng). 
 
Therefore, in order to correct the potential bias attributable to the wide range of 
variation in the number of taxpayers and inhabitants in different municipalities, the 
inequality indexes have been recalculated using the Theil (1) index. These values are 
homogenous among the observations of the sample, regardless of its size. Then, in order 
to check the relationship between this inequality index and the main factor used to 
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explain it, we have repeated the analysis of the basic statistics splitting the 
municipalities according to the prevailing land-use (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3. Main statistics of the database on the number of taxpayers in 1852 according 
to cluster land-use groups in each municipality of the province of Barcelona  
 
All 
municipalities 
Group 1 
winegrowing 
with cereal 
Group 2 
cereal-
cropping 
Group 3 
cereal with 
winegrowing 
Group 4 
wine-
growing 
Group 5 
forest 
 
Number 295 35 33 65 41 120 
Mean 0,195 0,190 0,193 0,210 0,146 0,206 
Median 0,192 0,165 0,191 0,200 0,139 0,202 
Standard 
deviation 
0,073 0,071 0,062 0,063 0,047 0,079 
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Figure 2. 
. 
Observing Table 3, mainly winegrowing municipalities (group 4), and also to 
some extent the mainly winegrowing municipalities with an important share of cereal-
cropping (group 1), were less unequal than the others (with an even lower standard 
deviation in cluster group 4). These results go in the same direction as those observed in 
Figure 3 and accentuate the differences between land-use groups. Considering Theil (1), 
the winegrowing municipalities were 25% more even than the whole sample, while the 
differences considering Gini indices were only 10%. 
 
V. ESTIMATING INEQUALITY IN PERSONAL AGRARIAN INCOMES OF THE 
ENTIRE POPULATION 
 
Now we will try to deal with the double bias encountered, due to the fact that the 
original dataset includes taxpayers only, not the entire rural population who earned 
incomes from agrarian activities; and also that many of these taxpayers appear in it with 
implausible incomes below the minimum subsistence level. The first bias reduces and 
the second one increases the actual inequality level, but without knowing their relative 
weight we cannot guess how they have skewed our database. To correct the first bias, 
we have subtracted from the population figures in the census of 1857 the number of 
landowners included in the lists of taxpayers of 1852, in order to then add to the original 
database the adult male population without any land, house or cattle of their own, taken 
as a zero group in the valuation of property in each municipality. Afterwards, so as to 
turn the ambiguous dataset on personal wealth into a clearer distribution of agrarian 
incomes, we have added a minimum vital income of 1,500 reales a year to the earning 
valuation of property held by all inhabitants included in the new dataset. As already 
explained, this vital income is obtained considering the unskilled daily wage of a 
Catalan labourer at the time multiplied by 260 working days a year. 
Unfortunately these two changes will entail some disadvantages as well. The 
major drawback is that all inequality levels resulting from the new dataset are, as we can 
expect, lowers than the original ones. If we obtain the histogram for the whole 
distribution of the new dataset, we can observe in Figure 5 a strong shift towards lower 
values, with a huge grouping of observations around 0.01 while the mean is 0.03. 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Theil Index histogram for all adult male 
population in all the municipalities of the province of 
Barcelona in 1852-1858 (lognormal fit) 
 
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Table 2. 
 
Nevertheless, comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4 obtained for taxpayers only the 
double peak of municipalities around two different levels of inequality has disappeared. 
This interesting result also appears in the separated histograms for municipalities with 
different land usages. Taking this strong shift towards a more even distribution into 
account, from now on we can only consider the relative differences between the new 
Theil indices obtained in each municipality and not their absolute values significant. 
The key question is how different are the new distributions from the previous ones 
obtained with only taxpayers. Is the equality increase of all municipalities in the dataset 
comparable to that of each different land-use category? Are the relative distances in 
inequality levels between winegrowing, cereal-cropping and forest municipalities 
maintained, increased or reduced? 
 
Table 4. Average Theil index in the original dataset compared with the ones calculated 
for estimated agrarian incomes of all male adult population, according to cluster land-
use groups of municipalities in the province of Barcelona in 1852-1858 
 
All 
 
Group 1 
winegrowing 
with cereal 
Group 2 
cereal-
cropping 
Group 3 
cereal with 
vines 
Group 4 
wine-
growing 
Group 5 
forest 
 
Number 295 36 33 65 41 120 
Theil index of only 
taxpayers 
0,195 0,185 0,193 0,210 0,146 0,206 
Theil index of all adult 
male population 
0,029 0,020 0,022 0,032 0,013 0,030 
% variation for 
taxpayer's group mean 
100,0 11,03% 11,52% 15,30% 8,68% 14,60% 
% variation for the 
average of all population 
100,0 71,0% 77,5% 111,9% 44,0% 105,0% 
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Figure 2 and Table 1. 
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The results obtained with the new dataset do not show in Table 4 an apparent 
change in the relative position of municipal inequality levels according to the main 
land-use. Nonetheless they stress the lower inequality in winegrowing municipalities 
(over 50% lower than the mean), together with the higher inequality in low-populated 
forestry zones (group 5), and also in mainly cereal-cropping areas with an important 
share of winegrowing (group 3). 
 
VI. TAKING POPULATION SIZE INTO ACCOUNT 
 
Another possible factor that could bias the inequality values obtained with our 
dataset is the distortion due to very different population densities. Following Boserup 
(1983) we have established at 65-70 inhabitants/km
2 
an upper threshold of population 
density able to be sustained with a highly intensive agrarian economy, and considered 
that with any population density greater than 70 inhabitants/km
2 
the society had to rely 
on other industrious or industrial economic activities at the time. To conduct an initial 
sensitivity analysis we have assembled in a new sample the Theil indices of 
municipalities that had population densities above 70 inhabitants/km
2 
in 1857, or were 
the capital of a district. The data has been obtained from the population density of each 
municipality weighed against the population density of the neighbouring municipalities, 
in order to correct for possible bias due to the existence of administrative units with 
different size (Table 5): 
 
Table 5. Average Theil index of municipalities with population densities >70 
inhab./km
2
 weighted against neighbouring ones, or being capital of a district in the 
province of Barcelona in 1852-1858 
 Capital of a district >70 inhabitants/km
2
 
Number 11 127 
Theil index of only taxpayers 0,124 0,185 
Theil index of all adult male population 0,015 0,028 
% variation for taxpayer's average 63,6 94,9 
% variation for the average of all population 51,7 96,6 
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Table 1. 
 
Looking at the right column in Table 5, and comparing with Table 4, we find out 
that the inequality indices of municipalities with population densities greater than 70 
inhabitants/km
2 
were rather similar than the ones obtained for the whole dataset. The 
distribution of these municipalities resembles the one found in winegrowing 
municipalities, with a high concentration of observations around low levels of 
inequality, slightly above the values obtained from the sample mean, and showing a 
marked difference between the mean and median values. In contrast, comparing with 
Table 4 the left column in Table 5 we can find inequality values in municipalities that 
were capitals of a district lower than the provincial average. This result is significantly 
enhanced when all adult male population is included. Owing to the fact that this group 
has only 11 observations, we will analyze each of them in detail (Table 6). 
The reasons that made the city of Barcelona and its surroundings a very special 
case are quite clear in Table 6. Only five municipalities had in 1852 a number of 
taxpayers greater than a thousand: Manresa (1,686), Terrassa (1,671), Mataró (1,319), 
Vic (1,284) and Vilanova i la Geltrú (1,071). In the municipal area where the city of 
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Barcelona now stands there were instead 9,353 property owners included in the tax list.
4
 
In this latter case they were mostly house owners or possessors of built-up land, not 
agricultural or forest landowners. Moreover, as it was the only city bringing together a 
population of 235,643 inhabitants in 1857 (while Mataró was only 16,595, Manresa 
15,264, Sabadell 13,945, Vic 13,712, Vilanova i la Geltrú 11,395 and Terrassa 8,721), 
the proportion of taxpayers among residents of Barcelona was one of the lowest in the 
province: one in 25, while in the other six cases it ranged from 5 to 16. 
 
Table 6. Theil inequality indices of taxpayers or all adult male population in 
municipalities being capital of a district in the province of Barcelona in 1852-1858 
Capitals of districts Taxpayers All adult male population 
Barcelona 0,089 0,010 
Arenys 0,090 0,031 
Berga 0,120 0,012 
Granollers 0,176 0,028 
Igualada 0,062 0,007 
Manresa 0,146 0,016 
Mataró 0,111 0,016 
Sant  Feliu de Llobregat 0,117 0,002 
Terrassa 0,136 0,013 
Vic 0,160 0,013 
Vilafranca del Penedès 0,126 0,012 
Mean of the Barcelona province 0,124 0,015 
Median of the Barcelona province 0,123 0,013 
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Table 1. 
 
The overall results shown in Table 6 also highlight the lower inequality degree 
of agrarian income distribution existing in larger towns and cities, compared with 
average values in the rest of rural municipalities. Among these urban areas the lowest 
inequality appeared in Barcelona, Arenys de Mar and Igualada district capitals. This 
result contrasts with the comparatively higher inequality found in urban municipalities 
that could be considered more industrial at the time.  
 
VII. ESTABLISHING THE INEQUALITY POSSIBLE FRONTIER (IPF) AND 
EXTRACTION RATIO (IER) 
 
After having incorporated the previous corrections and caveats in the calculation 
of Theil indices, now we have to face the most difficult task: how to overcome the lack 
of a clear pattern which apparently arises when comparing the land-use maps of the 
mid-19
th
 century with distribution of rural income inequality in the province (Figure 2). 
The main suggestion we get from this spatial comparison is that there was a greater 
historical contingency in the geographical patterns of agrarian wealth inequality than in 
the geographical distribution of prevailing land usages. This might be due to diverging 
local paths: while the landowners of a municipality could have decided to keep their 
forest and pasture lands exploited in the traditional manner, raising livestock and selling 
timber, firewood or charcoal, others might have chosen to establish in them a great deal 
of rabassa tenants who transformed the same sorts of marginal lands into vineyards. 
These different occasional decisions could have reinforced themselves over time in 
                                                 
4
 When constructing our dataset, the boundaries of the Barcelona urban system have been set into the 
limits of the current municipality; thus the data has been adjusted with the available in former 
municipalities that were aggregated to the city from 1897 onwards. 
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neighbouring areas, leading through path dependence and self-reinforcing loops to 
contrasting spatial realities juxtaposed into the same territory.  
The main question that arises is whether we can find or not some key omitted 
variables which could capture and explain a great deal of this intriguing contingency. 
The type of feudal jurisdiction –whether manorial, royal or under the church–, the 
inequality degree, and population densities at the beginning of this process could be 
considered good candidates. However, an important side of the question is that once the 
landowners of a place had decided to offer or not an opportunity to establish immigrants 
or disinherited people as winegrowing tenants in their marginal lands, this would have 
entailed consequences for population sizes and levels of wealth in each community. If 
there was any relationship between the level of wealth and inequality in a rural 
community, this could provide an interesting entryway to capture the disturbing degree 
of local contingency we found. This is why we decided to start working with the idea of 
an inequality possible frontier (thereinafter, IPF) which depends upon the level of 
agrarian wealth, as put forward by Milanovic et al. (2007). When the wealth of a 
community increases, so does the IPF since it may generate a greater distance between 
the vast majorities kept at subsistence level and a tiny elite who could concentrate the 
rest of income. 
Therefore, we are going to use the IPF in order to calculate new inequality 
indices of personal agrarian income adjusted to different levels of rural wealth. The first 
step is to work out the maximum values of income inequality in each municipality. 
Following Milanovic et al. (2007) the average income of the elite is:  
 
- -
- -       (4) 
 
where µ is the average income of the municipality, N is the total adult male population, 
s is the subsistence income and y ε is the percentage of population that represents the 
elite also in this municipality.  
To obtain the Theil index for the IPF (TheilIPF) of each municipality, we use 
equation (1). Then, the local population is divided into two groups, the first one with the 
subsistence income and the other which obtains the rest of the surplus of the 
municipality, as shown in equation (5). 
 
-      (5) 
 
If we consider µ=α·s, that is, we assume that the average income of the 
municipality is a multiple α of the subsistence income, then s=  : 
 
-
-
          (6) 
 
If we modify equation (4) assuming s= , then we have: 
 
- - -
-
      (7) 
 
And if we include this expression in equation (6), we have: 
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- -
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-
-
-
-
-
           (8) 
 
Lastly, to make comparable this index with the rest of the values obtained for the 
entire dataset we have normalized equation (8) depending on N. This is why we 
calculate the IPF for this indicator, that is, we assume that N-1 members of the 
municipality get the subsistence income, while one member receives the rest of the 
income. In this case we consider that ε·N=1, that is,  and then: 
 
-
-
-
-
-
- -
-
-
-
-
         (9) 
 
Therefore, the normalized TheilIPF index corresponds to: 
 
-
         (10) 
 
In Figure 6 we can observe the behaviour of the Theil'IPF depending on α, which 
is expressed as the number of times that the average income of the municipality exceeds 
the average value of subsistence for a fixed number N (thus assuming that all 
municipalities have the same dimension). 
 
Figure 6. An example of inequality possible frontier (IPF) expressed as the 
Theil’IPF indices resulting from α (the average income of the municipality as a 
multiple of the subsistence income) in the municipalities of the province of 
Barcelona in 1852-1858 
 
Source: our own, with equation (9) considering ε=0.05 and N=1000, using the dataset obtained 
from the same historical sources referred in Table 1. 
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From the calculus of the Theil‘IPF we can obtain the inequality extraction ration 
(IER thereinafter) for each municipality, considering: 
 
         (11) 
 
IER indicates the percentage of the actual inequality that existed in each 
municipality respect to the IPF, which is the maximum potential of inequality possible 
with a defined value for ε and α. To do this, we calculated from (9), assuming ε 
= 0.01 (the elite is 1% of the total population), N is the value of the adult male 
population of the municipality, and approaching α to the number of times that average 
income exceeds the mean income of the municipality. In this case, when ER → 0 the 
value indicates that the actual level of inequality registered in the municipality was well 
below the potential frontier of maximum value of inequality, that is, tend to potential 
high levels of equality. In the other extreme, when ER → 100% the level of inequality 
obtained is close to the level of maximum potential inequality. From (8) and (9) we can 
affirm that the maximum value of inequality may depend, besides the values of α and ε, 
of the size of the municipality considered. This bias is corrected when we consider IER. 
The distortion introduced in the calculation of maximum TheilIPF index by the 
different municipal population size can be seen by comparing Figure 6 and 7. Despite a 
clear upward trend, that is, a potential increase in inequality as the average income level 
grows, we observe in Figure 7 some deviations depending on the township size. 
 
Figure 7. Theil’IPF (1) indices resulting from average income of the 
municipality in Spanish reales a year for the whole dataset of the 
municipalities of the province of Barcelona in 1852-1858 
 
Source: Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Table 1. 
 
The last result confirm that the calculation of the IER may be a good 
approximation to the value of the actual inequality related to the maximum IPF of each 
municipality, which also helps us to correct potential errors resulting from very different 
population sizes in the database (Table 7): 
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Table 7. Extraction ratio (IER) as % of actual Theil index compared with the maximum IPF 
in agrarian income distribution, according to cluster land-use groups, population densities 
and other features in the municipalities of the province of Barcelona in 1852-1858 
 
extraction ratio 
(IER) 
number of 
municipalities 
All municipalities of the dataset 24.9% 295 
Group 1: winegrowing with cereal-cropping 24.3% 36 
Group 2: mainly cereal-cropping 25.0% 33 
Group 3: cereal-cropping with winegrowing 26.5% 65 
Group 4: mainly wine-growing 18.7% 41 
Group 5: mainly forest 26.3% 120 
With > 70 inhabitants per km
2
 23.4% 127 
District capitals only 25.0% 11 
To calculate the TheilIPF indices of each municipality, when the result was grater than 1 we considered that 1% of the 
population was the local elite. If not, we considered the elite made up of one person. Source: our own, from the same 
historical sources referred in Figure 2 and Table 1. 
 
Table 7 confirms many of the previously reported results, adding at the same 
time another perspective. Winegrowing municipalities were further away from potential 
levels of inequality while municipalities with mainly cereal-cropping and forest land 
usages were a bit closer to their maximum IPF. It is important to stress that this happens 
in spite of the fact of having previously included in our database a vital minimum 
income for all male adults, which inevitably entailed a compression of all Theil indices 
around very low absolute values of income inequality. Although the percentage 
differences found out in IER values are of the same order of magnitude as those in the 
Gini indices obtained with the original property values shown in Figure 3, they actually 
become much more relevant when the abovementioned bias is taken into account. The 
results are also very significant for the capitals of a district: before taking IPF into 
account this group recorded lower inequality values than in winegrowing municipalities, 
but their IER appear to be higher and close to the average. These evidences allow us to 
affirm that the study of income inequality using the IER approach has revealed some 
important hidden sides of the question.
5
 
 
To test the robustness of the exercise we repeat it considering Theil (0), where
6
: 
 
        (12) 
 
The Theil index for the IPF (TheilIPF) is obtained considering (12) and (5) as we 
have done before 
 
-        (13) 
 
If we consider µ=α·s, that is, we assume that the average income of the 
municipality is a multiple α of the subsistence income, then s=  : 
                                                 
5
 For example, while the One way Anova test suggests different IER averages when we consider the land-
use categories (at a 5% confidence level), the same test for mean IERs becomes statistically not 
significant when we consider other variables like different jurisdictional domains (manorial, royal or 
under the church) that prevailed in each municipality up to the abolition of feudalism in 1836. 
6
 For a more accurate discussion about the use of Theil (1) or Theil (0) as inequality indicators see 
Litchfield (1999) and Theil (1979). Theil (0) overemphasizes the differences in the lower tail of the 
distribution.  
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          (14) 
 
If we modify equation (4) assuming s= , then we have: 
 
- - -
-
       
 
And if we include this expression in equation (14), we have: 
 
- - -
-
- -
-
   
            (15) 
 
Therefore, the IER for each municipality is: 
 
         (16) 
 
Considering , the shape of the IER is described in figure 8, where the y-
axis is the Theil (0) index and the x-axis is α, that is, the number of times that the 
average income of the elites exceeds the average income of the municipality: 
 
Figure 8. Theil’IPF (0) indices and cluster group averages resulting from the value of α in each 
municipality (as the number of times that the average income of the elite exceeds the average 
income of the municipality) for the whole dataset, compared with the corresponding IPF in the 
municipalities of the province of Barcelona in 1852-1858 
 
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Figure 2 and Table 1. 
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Results go in the same direction to those observed in Figure 7, and help to make 
clearer an interesting point. Due to the fact that Theil (0) is independent of the size of 
each municipality, Figure 8 clearly shows the increasing distances of each observation 
to their corresponding maximum IPF. The overall distribution has a slight upward slope 
which confirms a growing inequality as the municipality's total agricultural wealth 
increased. However, the values of the maximum inequality frontier (IPF) increased even 
more. Therefore, as municipalities become wealthier the difference between the actual 
and potential inequality rose. Plotting the cluster land-use group averages in the graph 
also makes apparent that winegrowing municipalities where less rich and more even 
than forest and cereal-cropping ones, while averages of the mixed cases tended to group 
together in the wealthier and more unequal right side, near the cereal-cropping areas 
(probably because they coincided with more populated towns). 
If we repeat the exercise considering the level of inequality over the average per 
capita income in each municipality (x-axis) –in a comparable way with the tests made 
by Milanovic et al. (2007) at national level—, the results confirm again that 
municipalities with higher levels of average income show greater distances among 
actual and potential inequality (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Theil’IPF (0) indices and cluster group averages resulting from mean income of the 
municipality in Spanish reales a year for the whole dataset, compared with the corresponding 
curve of inequality possible frontier (IPF) in the municipalities of the province of Barcelona in 
1852-1858 
 
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Figure 2 and Table 1. 
 
Figures 8 and 9 summarize the main results found with our analysis. They 
confirm that before the Phylloxera plague vineyard specialization was mainly performed 
by poor landless peasants who sought to earn their living working as tenants on the thin 
and sloping soils leased to them by landowners. Nevertheless, this commercial 
specialization played a key role by linking the province of Barcelona with the emerging 
Atlantic economies, and giving way to an increase in population densities near the level 
-0,500
0,000
0,500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500 3.000 3.500
Theil (0) G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 Logarítmica (Theil (0) IPF (E=5%))
 
23 
 
of an urban-industrial economy (Badia-Miró et al. 2010). Figures 8 and 9 also uphold 
our initial hypothesis that agrarian income inequality was kept lower in wine-growing 
municipalities than in any other place. This reduction in income inequality took place 
notwithstanding the land improvements made by these poor winegrowers, which 
increased the wealth of the whole community thus enhancing the frontier of a possible 
maximum inequality (IPF). 
We have stressed a key feature throughout this paper: the hard work of terracing 
poor sloping soils and planting vineyards was a huge investment in land improvement 
(Olarieta et al. 2008), which consequently increased the wealth of the entire rural 
community. How can this be reconciled with the fact that average wealth in 
winegrowing townships appears to be the lowest in Figure 9? The distinction between 
agricultural wealth averages per person or unit of land becomes a key issue here. As can 
be seen in Table 8, wealth or income per unit of land was higher in wine-growing 
municipalities than in forestry areas or poor cereal zones intercropped with vines or 
olive trees. Nevertheless, per capita averages were lower in the former than the latter:  
 
Table 8. Average wealth per person and unit of agricultural land in Spanish reales, according 
to cluster land-use groups and population in the municipalities of the province of Barcelona 
in 1852-1858 
 number 
cadastral average per 
capita income  
cadastral average income 
per hectare  
mean median mean median 
all municipalities of the dataset 295 2,042.8 1,981.7 1,102.1 410.6 
G1: winegrowing with cereal   35 2,035.4 2,003.8 2,201.4 828.3 
G2: mainly cereal-cropping   33 2,076.9 2,015.2 3,518.9 884.7 
G3: cereal-cropping with vines   65 2,095.0 2,090.1    495.1 402.1 
G4: mainly wine-growing   41 1,932.0 1,916.0 1,626.5 975.5 
G5: mainly forest 120 2,049.5 1,979.4    252.7 200.6 
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Figure 2 and Table 1. 
 
Catalan vineyards were either spread over former forest and brushwood lands or 
replacing poor intercropped cereal lands previously sown within sparse rows of vines 
and olive trees. The right columns in Table 8 clearly confirm that vineyard 
specialization enhanced the wealth of land. However, left columns highlight that 
vineyards also required higher labour intensity and this increased population densities 
even more. Therefore per capita levels of agricultural income and wealth became the 
lowest, besides being more evenly distributed.  
This feature coincides with the estimates made in mid-18
th
 century France by 
François Quesnay who also attributed to the winegrowing peasant-owners the lowest 
non-wage agricultural income in his Tableau Économique and other writings 
(Milanovic 2010). However, French winegrowers were mainly property-holders: exactly 
the same status that Catalan rabassa tenants aimed to win some day with their collective 
struggle. Compared with their French counterparts, the Catalan wine-growing tenants 
can only be considered as would-be peasants. Nevertheless, their legal and actual status 
was also clearly stronger than many other tenants-at-will, or labour-tenants, that existed 
in several regions of Europe at the time, such as the statartorpare in Sweden, 
husmennene in Norway, husmaendene in Denmark, or heuerlinge in Northwestern 
Germany (Mörner 1970). Unlike the German heuerlinge-system (Schlumbohm 1996), 
for example, that left the disinherited layers of the rural society at the mercy of 
landowners' will, the Catalan rabassa winegrowers were entitled with a temporary 
ownership over the vines they had planted as long as the vineyard was kept alive 
(Carmona and Simpson 1999). 
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During the 19
th
 century many precarious heuerling-tenants emigrated from 
North-western Germany to the United States, while most Catalan rabassa-sharecroppers 
fiercely fought with the landowners to stay in the land and become wholly owners of it. 
In Albert Hirschman terms, the former took the 'exit' option while the latter raised their 
'voice' and organized a collective action (Hirschman 1970). Therefore, we may conclude 
that by transforming into vineyards a previous landscape of brushwood, forest and poor 
cereal crops these rabassa tenants not only opened a room for themselves among the 
Catalan population (Figure 1). They also gained a place in society and a share of its 
income (Garrabou et al. 2008). By increasing population numbers and deepening the 
home market, this eventually helped to turn Catalonia into a late-modern industrious 
society (De Vries 2008) and an early-contemporary industrial economy (Valls 2004). 
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS  
 
We conclude that despite the initial high degree of contingency found in the 
spatial location of Gini indices (Figure 2), and the lack of any simple correlation 
between inequality indices and other variables tested, we have discovered some relevant 
land-use patterns of inequality in personal agrarian wealth or income distribution in the 
municipalities of the Barcelona province in mid-19
th
 century. This land-use inequality 
profiles have been confirmed and enhanced by using Theil indices of estimated income 
distribution for all the adult local population, and applying the inequality possible 
frontier (IPF) approach to compare the actual extraction ratio (IER) with the maximum 
attainable one.  
The results confirm that agrarian inequality was lower in winegrowing 
municipalities than in mainly cereal-cropping or forest ones, in spite of the fact that 
attaining higher population densities, developing a commercial vineyard specialization, 
and increasing the total wealth above a subsistence line, could have also meant an 
extended frontier (IPF) of possible inequality through a greater potential extraction ratio 
(IER) by an agrarian elite. As noted in the introduction, this outcome stands somehow 
against the opposite expected pathway according to the existing literature and other 
historical examples. This counterexample can be interpreted as a historical process of 
empowerment achieved by the Catalan rural class of wine-growing tenants tanks to the 
long-lasting social fight they waged from the 18
th
 century onwards, as other diachronic 
and more descriptive case studies have already suggested.  
In this sense, the statistical cross-section analysis conducted with a remarkably 
large database of more than 86,000 recorded taxpayers in 295 municipalities has 
provided for the first time solid quantitative answers to a set of questions posed for a 
long time by Catalan rural historians. Our results also reinforce the ideas of those who 
argue that, beyond the undeniable impact of purely economic factors, the historical path 
followed by wealth or income distribution moves between greater degrees of freedom 
under a strong influence of other social, cultural and political forces (Atkinson et al. 
2007). As Krugman (2007) has pointed out, changes in regulations, institutions and 
politics matter. 
Beyond the analysis of agrarian inequality here conducted only from a land-use 
standpoint, this large database offers many possibilities to be exploited from other 
perspectives.  In future research we will use the different indices obtained with this in-
depth analysis on personal agrarian inequality to extend a model previously developed 
to identify the main driving forces that led to vineyard specialization in the province of 
Barcelona (Tello et al. 2008; Garrabou et al. 2009).  This will allow us to include wealth 
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and income distribution as new variables in that model, together with population 
density, time-distances to the main seaports, main agronomical and environmental 
features of the territory –like average slopes, rainfall or temperatures—, and the sort of 
manorial or royal feudal jurisdiction that existed prior to their abolition in 1836. Adding 
to our dataset on cadastral valuation of agricultural wealth other commercial, industrial 
and professional incomes estimated in another volume, the same historical source will 
allow in future to calculate the social tables of income distribution in Catalonia, and 
conduct a decomposition analysis of its within, between or overlapping factors. 
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Annex 
 
Table A1. Number of taxpayers in the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate 
Ownership of 1852 in the Barcelona province 
Districts of the  
Barcelona province 
taxpayers 
 
all 
with  less than 
2,000 reales 
% 
with  less than 
1,500 reales 
% 
Barcelona 11,940 7,642 64.0 7,004 58.7 
Arenys 6,774 6,161 91.0 5,980 88.3 
Berga 3,657 2,970 81.2 2,820 77.1 
Granollers 8,384 7,608 90.7 7,447 88.8 
Igualada 9,852 9,055 91.9 8,785 89.2 
Manresa 9,561 8,796 92.0 8,601 90.0 
Mataró 5,326 4,748 89.1 4,576 85.9 
Sant  Feliu de Llobregat 8,673 8,021 92.5 7,834 90.3 
Terrassa 8,276 7,659 92.5 7,491 90.5 
Vic 7,356 6,430 87.4 6,242 84.9 
Vilafranca del Penedès 6,500 5,676 87.3 5473 84.2 
Province of Barcelona 86,299 74,766 86.6 72,253 83.7 
Source: our own, from the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 in the Barcelona 
province (Library of the University of Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13). 
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Table A2. Taxes paid and tax burden of tax payers above and below an attributed cadastral 
income of 2,000 reales a year in the Barcelona province, according to the Distribution of 
Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 (in reales a year or %) 
 
 
Districts of the 
Barcelona province 
estimated 
cadastral 
income of 
all 
taxpayers 
taxpayers with more than 2,000 reales 
estimated 
cadastral 
income  
% of all 
income 
attributed  
taxes  
paid  
% of all 
taxes paid  
% of tax 
burden  
Barcelona 40,745,709 36,242,839 88.9 4,447,032 87.4 12.3 
Arenys 5,918,547 3,362,731 56.8 513,458 55.6 15.3 
Berga 5,061,354 3,708,250 73.3 541,062 68.5 14.6 
Granollers 7,774,228 5,178,452 66.6 812,785 66.3 15.7 
Igualada 6,778,104 3,579,993 52.8 629,203 50.2 17.6 
Manresa 6,933,038 4,343,674 62.7 755,428 60.5 17.4 
Mataró 5,076,673 2,980,214 58.7 472,361 57.0 15.8 
Sant  Feliu de 
Llobregat 
6,555,209 3,710,259 56.6 606,685 55.1 16.4 
Terrassa 6,571,379 3,781,913 57.6 580,909 57.3 15.4 
Vic 6,994,514 5,110,590 73.1 1,039,174 72.2 20.3 
Vilafranca del Penedès 7,038,780 4,895,405 69.5 890,345 68.2 18.2 
Barcelona province 105,447,534 76,894,320 72.9 11,288,442 69.6 14.7 
Districts of the 
Barcelona province 
taxes paid 
by all 
taxpayers 
taxpayers with less than 2,000 reales 
estimated 
cadastral 
income  
% of all 
income 
attributed  
taxes  
paid  
% of all 
taxes paid 
% of tax 
burden  
Barcelona 5,087,106 4,502,870 11.1 640,074 12.6 14.2 
Arenys 923,500 2,555,816 43.2 410,042 44.4 16.0 
Berga 790,410 1,353,104 26.7 249,348 31.5 18.4 
Granollers 1,225,356 2,595,776 33.4 412,571 33.7 15.9 
Igualada 1,252,699 3,198,111 47.2 623,496 49.8 19.5 
Manresa 1,249,441 2,589,364 37.3 494,013 39.5 19.1 
Mataró 829,013 2,096,459 41.3 356,653 43.0 17.0 
Sant  Feliu de 
Llobregat 
1,100,946 2,844,950 43.4 494,261 44.9 17.4 
Terrassa 1,013,776 2,789,466 42.4 432,866 42.7 15.5 
Vic 1,439,601 1,883,924 26.9 400,427 27.8 21.3 
Vilafranca del Penedès 1,304,541 2,143,375 30.5 414,196 31.8 19.3 
Barcelona province 16,216,389 28,553,214 27.1 4,927,947 30.4 17.3 
Source: our own, from the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 in the Barcelona 
province (Library of the University of Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13). 
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